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Teddy Brett's sometimes amusing, but more often
confusing paper defies straightforward comment. In
order to see better what he is driving at, I shall attempt
to suimnarize the points which appear to be central to
his argument:-
Planners (in Brett's view, economists), in
their concern to read the future, Lp4O itLCtO lose contact
with the real world. Thus "plans fail to reach their
targets or do so by accident".
Planners are to be exposed and resisted because
their creed (or rather the one carrying Brett's ¿n1p)iuJnatu)L)
necessarily places them either in a position where they
apply "valuefree" tools to achieve the objectives
laid down by the politicians who employ them, or one
in which they retain their autonomy by manipulating
the decision-making process. In the first case, they
are merely the naive or acquiescent servants of an elite,
while in the second, they themselves pursue elitist
policies.
Planning is not concerned with measures of
progress other than that provided by the growth of GDP.
Its claim to "rationality" is an attempt to isolate
and disarm those groups (perhaps the majority of the
population) who lose in the process of economic change,
for changes in the degree of inequality are not reflected
in GDP figures.
Let us examine each of these in turn.
The first point raises two separate issues and
deserves a more thorough discussion than its use as
a waspish opening gambit. By implicitly labelling the
prediction of the consequences of pursuing any set of
policies as "reading the future", Brett wants us to
give it a status camparable to that usually accorded
to clairvoyancy. In doing so, he completely misrepresents




(or misunderstands) the nature of the claims made by
economics as an (admittedly imperfect) predictive science.
For example, if an extra £1,000 million of aggregate
demand were injected now into the UK economy, a competent
economist in the field could probably specify the consequent
fall in the proportion of the workforce still unemployed
in a year's time to within one or two tenths of a percentage
point. The fact that no economist, however inspired,
could get the figure right to the last man does not
make the former prediction useless. This is not to
argue that any margin of predictive error is admissible
or that economists have never "failed" in this sense,
but only to state the obvious point that judging "success"
or "failure" requires agreed criteria. The one that
Brett seeks to impose cannot be seriously entertained.
A related point (and one which he seems to have had
in mind later in the paper) is that economists may
not be able to predict the future movements of crucially
rele.rant non-economic variables. For example, how
high can unemployment rise before there occurs a serious
political upheaval? This is certainly a question to
which a good "planner" (as opposed to a mere economist)
must be able to give an answer (we will excuse him
from trying to get the figure right to the last man),
and it can be asserted with some force that planners
who are basically economists have often been woefully
naive politically.
The second issue here concerns the vital distinction
between the "Plan" as a document embodying a set of
targets and the means to achieve them, and planning
as an ongoing input into the much wider process whereby
particular structural changes in a society are consciously
and deliberately sought. Many of these structural
changes remain necessarily imperceptible for decades
or even generations, and in consequence, do not and
cannot figure in the balance sheet of success and failure
in meeting the targets of a five year "Plan". To judge
the success of planning purely in terms of fulfilling
plan targets is to fail to understand the nature of
planning(1) and to take the rhetoric of "Plans" at
its face value, something which Brett rightly insists
This point is stressed in different ways by Dudley
Seers, "The Prevalence of Pseudo Planning", and by
Brian Van Arkadie, "Planning in Tanzania" in M. Faber
(edj, C&L6e2 Ln P.eannLng: 144ae4 ctkld E>pe.nLenee,
Sussex University Press, (in press).
must not be done.
Of course, it may happen that particular regimes
(Haiti, doubtless, included) pursue objectives which
offend the moral sensibilities of not overly sensitive
planners. Whether or not planners should contribute
to the achievement of such objectives is for them very
much a moral choice; but what has been argued here
about the predictive power of economics and the nature
of planning remains unaltered. Again, "Plans" are often
empty exercises quite devoid of political and operational
content, (1) a state of affairs which often prevails
in situations posing acute moral dilemmas. A claim
to have planned Haiti deserves to be tieated with contempt,
but for reasons which Brett has left largely unexpressed.
The alternative to a conscious and deliberate search
for policies to bring about desired structural changes
in society is to leave the process of change to be determined
by the operation of the tÇO4c. ma.jewte of nature. To
choose that matters should be thus is also to make a
moral choice.
Now to the planner's "creed". The difficulty
with descriptions of this kind is that the likelihood
of finding more than a handful of individuals who approximate
even roughly to such a stereotype is very remote. Would
any right-minded, paternalistic father allow his daughter
to marry such a man? Article 1 is for wishful thinkers
and the malevolent - "give us the ends and we will furnish
the means". Of course, any claim to "rationality" except
in terms of the ends sought is untenable in this case.
What counts is that the use of social science techniques
is not value free. It should be clear from even the
most cursory examination of the process of planning
that an economist's economist cannot subscribe to Article
2 - that planning is economic. The true malaise is
that planning is often obsessively quantitative simply
because numbers are much easier to grapple with than
processes. The statistic "200 extra co-operatives"
is just as much a social or political indicator as an
economic one.(2)
(7) DudTy Seers, ûp.c.Lt.
(2) The definition of what is "economic", even within
the discipline, is a contentious issue. Bhagwatí defines
an economic policy to be one which moves the society
closer to a Pareto optimum. Accepting this criterion,
many import substitution programmes followed by LDCs
must be judged "non-economic".
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Strikingly enough, Article 3 is a flO Vt 44LLLtWL in
relation to 1 and 2, so only those deficit in logic
need subscribe to it. The notion that economists involved
in planning do their work bound by Pigovian strictures
concerning the "measuring rod of money" is just not
sustainable. Granted a modicum of professional competence,
they can usually arrive at policies which will promote
(if not achieve) the maximization of any weighted index
of commodities and levels of factor use, and since planning
is to some extent a substitute for the market process
which creates values in the sense of determining money
prices, it is anything but solely concerned with money.
This countervailing influence to the Transatlantic tradition
is traceable to the Soviet experience and is an undeniably
healthy one. Moreover, the whole tortured welfare economics
debate of the thirties and forties, to which Pigou made
a distinguished contribution, was precisely about the
distribution of goods among individuals and how the
welfare effects of changes in that distribution were
to be judged. There has never been any suggestion that
maximizing GDP necessarily maximizes welfare. In fact,
the issue of whether those who lose by a change could
be compensated by those who gain, if never fully resolved
analytically, has occupied an important place in the
literature. (1, If "Plans" have failed to take account
of the distributional consequences of the policies contained
therein (and this has often been the case), there has
been a failure, not of economics, but of plan economists
imprisoned in intellectual stasis by cherished but inappro-
priate models.
There remains the charge that "planistrators'
rationality (is substituted) for demands from below
as the basis from which economic policy should be evolved".
Whether or not planning promotes and reinforces elitist
politics is a very important question. The only point
I wish to make concerns the nature of "demands from
below". If these stem from populism, then there can
be no planning in the sense discussed here because the
process of achieving long run structural changes is
almost certain to be incompatible with populist politics.
(1) This has been especially true of the debate as
it affected the theory of international trade. t/-Lde,
W. F. Stolper and P. A. Samuelson, "Protection and Real
Wages", RuíehQ o Ec.ofloni.Lc S-th.cUe.4, vol. 9, (1941);
and P. A. Samuelson, "The Gains from International Trade
Once Again", EcwVtom-Lc. Jou,tria.e, vol. 72, (1962).
Other well known variants are democratic centralism,
which in practice is overwhelmingly central and not
particularly democratic, and decentralization on the
East European pattern, which is apparently concerned
with improving economic efficiency by providing managers
with greater decision-making autonomy, but is probably
more an institutional response (a change in the rules
of the game) to the emergence of a substantial middle
class. Some writers(1) have advanced arguments in favour
of central planning for less developed countries
on the grounds that management and decision-making ability
are an acutely scarce resource which must, therefore,
be used centrally and that profound structural changes
require strong central direction. Where "demands from
below" enter all this is left far from clear. But the
process whereby groups compete for resources will not
wilt for lack of academic commentary.
Finally, and very briefly, I want to restate the
well known point that "planning" is often a facade,
sometimes an empty one, at others a substantial item
in the armoury which sustains in power corrupt and rapacious
elites. If that is Teddy Brett's central message, then
I have no quarrel with it.
(1) Brian Van Arkadie, op.cL., and Arnost Tauber,
"Development and Changes in Conceptions of Planning
in Socialist Countries", in Faber, Op.C.Lt.
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